When a buyer is able to obtain cheaper input prices from a supplier, is it possible that other buyers will have to pay more for the same input as a result? Is this bad for consumers? We present a model that analyzes the conditions under which the asymmetric exercise of buyer power can lead to consumer detriment through raising other buyers'wholesale prices (the "waterbed e¤ect"). This can arise when the di¤erent buyers compete against each other. A loss of consumer surplus due to the waterbed e¤ect is also more likely if the adversely a¤ected buyers are already su¢ ciently "squeezed"in terms of higher wholesale prices and smaller market share. Instead, all retail prices decrease and all consumers bene…t if suppliers have little scope to set discriminatory wholesale prices due to the presence of su¢ ciently attractive substitutes.
Introduction
In Spring 2008, the UK's Competition Commission completed its inquiry into the national grocery retail market. 1 The purchasing power of the biggest retailers was one of the key issues in this inquiry. Amongst several other concerns, including the possible negative e¤ects on suppliers'incentives to invest and innovate, the Commission, for the …rst time, also looked seriously into the possibility of a "waterbed e¤ect": the theory that moreadvantageous terms of trade for larger or otherwise more powerful buyers could lead to worse terms for their less powerful rivals. On previous occasions, the UK's antitrust authorities had chosen not to consider the possibility of a waterbed e¤ect on the grounds that it lacked an economic foundation.
2 This paper o¤ers a logically consistent foundation for a theory of the waterbed e¤ect.
In addition, and possibly more importantly, this paper provides antitrust authorities with guidelines on when to expect such a waterbed e¤ect to be strong and, in particular, even su¢ ciently strong to lead to a reduction in consumer surplus or welfare. Ultimately, the Competition Commission came to the conclusion that there was insuf…cient empirical evidence to support the existence of a waterbed e¤ect in the UK's grocery market. However, the deliberations made in the course of the several inquiries in the UK have brought this novel theory of competitive harm to the attention of other antitrust authorities and, more generally, to a wider audience of antitrust scholars. 4 The theory of the waterbed e¤ect that we develop cautions against what could possibly be a too-positive picture of powerful buyers as "consumers'champions". 5 In particular, it emphasizes that an appropriate analysis of the implications of buyer power can not stop at the vertical dimension, but also must take into account how a given buyer's power vis-à-vis suppliers compares with that of competing buyers. The present theory of the waterbed e¤ect shows that, in principle, the exercise of such di¤erential (or asymmetric) buyer power may harm consumers already in the short run-i.e., even when the number of …rms and the quality and range of their products all remain constant. 6 While a large and powerful …rm improves its own terms of supply by exercising its bargaining power, the terms of its competitors can deteriorate su¢ ciently so as to ultimately increase average retail prices and, thereby, reduce total consumer surplus. A key contribution of this paper, beyond providing a formally consistent underpinning for the waterbed e¤ect, is that it derives conditions for when we should expect the waterbed e¤ect to be strong and for when we should expect it to be negligible. We …nd that the observed level of wholesale price discrimination should be key: Consumer detriment from the waterbed e¤ect is more likely if the adversely a¤ected …rms are already su¢ ciently squeezed, due to relatively higher wholesale prices and, consequently, lower market shares.
As noted above, the UK's grocery inquiry, which has raised substantial interest among antitrust agencies around the world, provides the main background to this analysis. However, there is also much wider current interest in buyer power. In Europe, in a number of high-pro…le merger cases in the retailing industry, concerns about buyer power have lead to outright prohibitions or the imposition of speci…c remedies. 7 The growing buying power of large retailers has also made several European countries rethink their economic dependency laws. For instance, the German competition law was changed in 2008 to tighten provisions on non-cost justi…ed discounts, thereby ensuring a level playing …eld for smaller retailers. 8 Finally, the interest in buyer power goes beyond the narrow boundaries of antitrust 6 In our model, the waterbed e¤ect is already work in the short run, as manifested by the coincidence of a decrease in wholesale prices for some buyers and an increase for other buyers. This is a major di¤erence when compared to the "spiral e¤ec"", another theory of competitive harm from buyer power that is prominent. The theory of the spiral e¤ect is much more prospective: Competitive harm should be expected only in the long run, when less powerful rivals have exited the market, thereby creating scope for a price increase by the remaining oligopolists. Compared to the spiral e¤ect theory, that of a waterbed e¤ect seems, thus, to be more easily testable -and also refutable, as evidenced by the Competition Commission's decision in the grocery inquiry.
7 E.g., Rewe/Meinl, Kesko/Tuko, and Carrefour/Promodes (Case no IV/M.1221, Case no IV/M.784, and Case no IV/M.1684, respectively).
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policy. The issue of buyer power increasingly attracts public interest for two reasons. First, governments, often pressured by lobby groups but also supported by parts of the public, are concerned about the survival of the small shopkeeper (e.g., the local convenience store).
Second, especially in relation to farmers, the exercise of buyer power is often regarded as "unfair." For instance, in the case of dairy products, most notably milk prices, several
European countries (e.g., Germany and the UK) have had public discussions and o¢ cial inquiries on the fate of farmers facing increasingly large and powerful retail chains.
At …rst, the notion of a waterbed e¤ect would strike economists as being ill-conceived.
If a supplier can raise prices, at least with respect to some retailers, then why would he wait to do so until other, more powerful, retailers demanded an additional discount?
In fact, previous arguments often invoked some "break-even" constraint of suppliers. To economists, this looks rightly like an ill-founded accounting exercise that is not based on …rms'optimal strategies. 9 The present analysis shows, however, that a simple economic logic can underlie such a waterbed e¤ect.
In our model, buyer power arises from size. 10 A larger buyer's additional discount allows it to reduce retail prices and, thereby, attract additional business, some of which will be captured at the expense of other, less powerful buyers. As this lowers not only sales volume, but also purchase volume, for the latter …rms, their bargaining position vis-à-vis suppliers is further worsened, resulting in less favorable terms of supply. As a consequence, prices paid to suppliers by a large buyer have indeed fallen, and prices paid by smaller …rms have risen.
In terms of retail prices, if prices are strategic complements, then for smaller buyers, two con ‡icting forces are at work. While smaller buyers would optimally like to pass on some of the increase in their wholesale price, they simultaneously face more aggressive competition from the larger buyer, given that the terms of trade of the large buyer have improved. While the latter e¤ect often may be su¢ ciently strong so that all consumers 9 This is also why the UK's antitrust authorities seem to have ruled out the relevance of a waterbed e¤ect in their previous inquiries into the grocery retail industry (e.g., in Competition Commission, 2000, "Supermarkets: A Report on the Supply of Groceries from Multiple Stores in the United Kingdom," Cm 4842). On the other hand, the possibility of a waterbed e¤ect has been explicitly acknowledged in the European Commission's Guidelines on horizontal agreements (European Commission, 2001 , Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Horizontal Agreements, O¢ ce Journal C31/5-18, para. 126 and 135). 10 The precise logic for why size creates buyer power will di¤er somewhat between the case in which size is generated through acquisitions and the case in which size is generated through more-e¢ cient operations.
bene…t from the exercise of buyer power, our model also allows us to characterize the opposite circumstances: when the waterbed e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong to increase even the average prevailing retail price.
11 In this case, total consumer surplus can decrease through the working of a waterbed e¤ect.
A key presumption of the main analysis in this paper is that more-powerful buyers obtain discounts not only through lump-sum payments (e.g., slotting allowances or listing fees) but also "at the margin." The key di¤erence is the following: Only in the latter case should we reasonably expect that better terms of supply are passed on to consumers, even in the short run. For the present theory of the waterbed e¤ect, this is important since, otherwise, the more powerful buyer would not enjoy a more competitive position at the retail market. Instead, if discounts were granted only "infra-marginally"-e.g., through lump-sum payments -then buyers would face a level playing …eld in the retail market, regardless of their size or other factors that determine their respective bargaining positions.
Recent evidence from the aforementioned investigation into the UK's grocery retail market strongly supports the picture that, at least in this industry and for the UK, discounts are given "at the margin." 12 The present model captures this in an admittedly simplistic way, namely through assuming linear wholesale contracts. 13 What is key for our results to hold and our theory of the waterbed e¤ect to apply is simply that better terms of trade result in a more competitive position in the retail market. The assumed linearity of wholesale contracts is, instead, relevant only to the explicitly calculated example with 11 In fact, in our model, all retail prices will typically be lower if the outlet of the large buyer (chain) has not yet acquired a dominant position in the considered (local) markets. See Basker (2005) and Basker and Noel (2007) on the price impact of an entry by More precisely, the UK's Competition Commission calculated the relative discount obtained by the largest grocers relative to their smaller rivals, both with respect to the overall net price (i.e., the price net of all payments, whether "…xed or variable") and with respect to only "variable" discounts. They found that discounts were larger when considering only the "variable" components. See Competition Commission (2007), Working Paper on Supplier Pricing, at http://www.competitioncommission.org.uk/inquiries/ref2006/grocery/further_working_papers.htm. The Competition Commission notes that these "variable discounts" also include price reductions to fund promotions or per-unit retroactive rebates, all of which e¤ectively lower the (anticipated) unit price that a retailer pays, thereby inducing him to price more competitively.
13 Interestingly, while many supply contracts are indeed much more complex, casual evidence also suggests that this does not apply to all goods uniformly. E.g., we are aware of instances where fresh produce, bakery products or milk are sold to retailers with a perfectly linear contract. On the theoretical side, Iyer and Villas-Boas (2003) and Milliou, Petrakis and Vettas (2005) also o¤er some support for the use of simple, linear contracts. linear demand. This short discussion of the role of contracts between retailers and suppliers suggests that the present theory of the waterbed e¤ect could play a larger role in environments in which discounts are more likely to a¤ect short-run competition. We will, however, also provide a discussion of the case with non-linear contracts below (cf. Section 4.3).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates our analysis to the extant literature on buyer power. Section 3 introduces and analyzes the benchmark case of symmetric …rms, while Section 4 provides the main analysis with asymmetric buyers.
Section 5 contains several extensions that provide, in particular, further comparative results. The concluding remarks in Section 6 pull together the various results so as to provide summary guidelines for policy.
Related Literature
Generally, our analysis contributes to the ongoing debate about the economic implications of non-cost justi…ed discounts that more-powerful buyers can negotiate. Battigalli et al. (2006) , Chen (2005) , Inderst and Wey (2003, 2007) , and Vieira-Montez (2007) all analyze the long-run implications of buyer power on the upstream industry. Inderst and Valletti (2009) study, instead, the implications of a ban on price discrimination on downstream incentives to invest in cost reduction. Earlier contributions by von Ungern-Sternberg (1996) and Dobson and Waterson (1997) analyze when the bene…ts of lower wholesale prices can outweigh the impact from a further monopolization of the retail market. In their model, symmetric buyers grow through acquisitions. In contrast, our model focuses on the exercise of di¤erential buyer power, which may harm consumer, even though, in the short run, it has no e¤ect on the number of competitors or on the breadth and depth of their o¤ering.
The identi…ed waterbed e¤ect is also distinct from "strategic overbuying" with the intent or consequence of raising rivals' costs. Here, the large buyer incurs a short-term reduction in pro…ts with the objective of future recoupment.
14 Furthermore, the predictions of the waterbed e¤ect stand in marked contrast to those from theories that predict a positive externality for other buyers if a large and powerful buyer plays out his bargaining 14 On strategic overbuying, see Salop (2005) .
power. Snyder (1996) shows how a large buyer's orders can destabilize supplier collusion and, thereby, also lower the prices that other buyers must pay for their smaller orders.
In Chen (2003) , a supplier sets the linear wholesale price for a fringe of small buyers before negotiating with a large buyer. As the large buyer becomes more powerful, which is modeled as a shift in the sharing rule for the Nash bargaining game, the supplier tries to recapture some of the lost pro…ts by selling more to the fringe, which requires it to lower the respective wholesale price.
Winter (1996), Gans and King (2002) , and Majumdar (2005) all show that if one buyer or buyer group has a …rst-mover advantage, then it can bene…t at the expense of smaller buyers. In Majumdar (2005) , this can also manifest itself, as in our paper, in a more competitive position at the retail market. According to our theory, however, if the market structure remains unchanged, a waterbed e¤ect is only present when the respective buyers are also downstream competitors. 15 Finally, the present analysis complements that in Inderst (2007) . There, the focus is on the creation of di¤erences in buyer size, namely through acquisitions or improvement of own e¢ ciency. It is shown that buyers that are already larger have also higher incentives to grow further. In a Hotelling model it is shown that the resulting negative impact on rival …rms is ampli…ed by the waterbed e¤ect.
Instead, the present model generally derives the foundations of a waterbed e¤ect and obtains implications for consumer surplus and welfare.
The Benchmark Case with Symmetric Buyers
We take the following stylized picture of a market in which downstream …rms engage in local competition. There are altogether n = 1; :::; N symmetric …nal markets. In each market, two downstream …rms -referred to as A n and B n -compete. The case of geographically segmented markets may be particularly applicable to retailing. Though there may be a number of competing chains, in a given local market, consumers can choose between just a few outlets.
16 15 More recently, Smith and Thanassoulis (2009) o¤er an alternative theory of bargaining in bilateral oligopolies with uncertainty, which can also generate a waterbed e¤ect. This is discussed further below. See, also, Schi¤ (2008) for the analysis of a di¤erent "waterbed e¤ect" in the context of price regulation of a multiproduct …rm. 16 In retailing, in particular in the "one-stop-shopping"segment of super-or hypermarkets, the assumption of a tight local oligopoly (and, in particular, no further entry) is also often realistic given local planning restrictions.
For now, each downstream …rm has the same constant marginal cost c 0. Downstream …rms can procure from the same supplier, which operates at constant marginal cost k 0. We stipulate that …rms transform one unit of purchased input into one unit of output. The constant input price is given by w(A n ) and w(B n ), respectively. We denote a downstream …rm's "gross" marginal cost (i.e., including the wholesale price) by m(A n ) := c + w(A n ) and m(B n ) := c + w(B n ), respectively. All cost parameters are common knowledge. Note also that, for the moment, each downstream …rm operates independently. Section 4 introduces large buyers that operate multiple downstream …rms.
Furthermore, in Section 5, we allow for di¤erences in size that arise from the fact that …rms have di¤erent marginal costs (c(A n ) and c(B n )).
At this point, recall our discussion of the role of linear wholesale prices in the Introduction. All that matters for the present theory of the waterbed e¤ect is that (additional) discounts are given at least partially "at the margin," where they matter for a …rm's competitive position in the downstream market.
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In each local market, …rms compete in prices, which we denote by p(A n ) and p(B n ), respectively. We further suppose that there is a unique equilibrium in prices and denote the realized pro…ts by (m(A n ); m(B n )) for …rm A n and, symmetrically, by (m(B n ); m(A n )) for …rm B n . We assume that the derived pro…t function is strictly decreasing in the marginal cost with 1 ( ) < 0 for the respective derivatives. In addition, we stipulate that the second derivatives satisfy 11 > 0 and 12 < 0:
(1)
The conditions in (1) are commonly invoked in the literature and are satis…ed by many functional speci…cations (cf. Athey and Schmutzler, 2001) . 18 Below, we comment more on the role of (1).
The existence of a waterbed e¤ect will be independent of whether prices are strategic complements or substitutes. If prices are strategic substitutes, then it is straightforward that the adversely a¤ected downstream …rm raises its retail price -following a reduction of its rival's and an increase of its own wholesale price. In what follows, we will, therefore, deal mainly with the more interesting case of strategic complements, implying that, through competition, a countervailing e¤ect arises: While the adversely a¤ected …rm would want 17 Cf. also, for instance, Katz (1987) , DeGraba (1990 ), or Yoshida (2000 for models with linear supply contracts. 18 Alternatively, see Katz (1986) for a di¤erent application.
to pass on a higher wholesale price, the fact that its rival's retail price decreases will exert a countervailing force.
Negotiations
Wholesale contracts are determined through simultaneous and publicly observable take-itor-leave-it o¤ers that the incumbent supplier makes to all downstream …rms. In the present model, buyer power derives from the respective value of a buyer's outside option. More precisely, if a downstream …rm rejects the (incumbent) supplier's o¤er, it can access an alternative source of supply. This comes at the additional expenditure F > 0. Following the seminal contribution of Katz (1987) , we may suppose that a downstream …rm has the alternative to integrate backwards. 19 In Katz (1987) , this alternative is su¢ ciently attractive for only the largest buyer, while in our analysis it will represent a credible alternative for all downstream …rms. In the context of retailing, we may also interpret this alternative as an investment in the production and marketing of a private-label good.
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Alternatively, we may suppose that another supplier bids against the incumbent. In this case, the cost F would represent a …xed switching cost, which may also, fully or partially, arise at the supplier. Finally, we can also imagine that, after rejecting the incumbent's o¤er, a downstream …rm has to incur search costs F to locate a new source of supply.
21
When accessing the alternative source of supply, a downstream …rm can operate at "gross" marginal cost -i.e., again including the wholesale price, of m AL := c + k AL .
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With linear wholesale prices, results are una¤ected by whether or not bilateral contracts are observed by other downstream …rms. We discuss this in more detail in Section 4.3. For the time being, we assume that o¤ers, as well as downstream …rms'decisions to accept or reject the supplier's o¤er, are observable.
Analysis with Symmetric Buyers
19 Cf. also La¤ont and Tirole (1990) for such a "bypass" technology. 20 There are many cases in which retail chains have indeed substituted a branded good for a privatelabel alternative. For instance, the German discounter ALDI is famous for this strategy. An alternative strategy, which our model does not intend to capture, is to stock a private-label good next to that of a branded supplier, thereby putting more price pressure on the branded good. 21 We abstract from the possibility that a …rm may strategically procure from multiple suppliers (cf. Biglaiser and Vettas, 2005) . 22 Note that we assume that both inputs have the same quality, though the analysis can be extended in this direction. One special case is that in which one unit of the alternative good can, more generally, be transformed into units of the …nal good. Another alternative is that in which the other good is inferior in the eyes of all consumers. We allowed for the latter possibility in our working paper version, though only in the Hotelling model.
Key to the analysis of wholesale prices are the participation constraints for downstream …rms, namely
for …rm A n and
for …rm B n . Note that we used for (2) and (3) that in case of rejecting the supplier's o¤er, the respective downstream …rm can operate with gross marginal cost m AL , while its rival still operates with gross marginal cost m(A n ) or m(B n ), respectively. The value of the respective outside option is given by the right-hand side of both (2) and (3).
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Clearly, the constraints (2) and (3) need not always be binding. In particular, they
would not be binding if either F or k AL were su¢ ciently high, thereby making the alternative supply option su¢ ciently unattractive. In this case, increasing the wholesale prices until the constraints bind would not be optimal for the supplier, given that he would then sell only a very low quantity. We want to exclude this case and focus, instead, on the situation where the alternative option is su¢ ciently attractive so as to e¤ectively constrain the supplier's optimal choice of wholesale prices. We do this by stipulating that k AL is just equal to the current supplier's marginal cost k. For simplicity, we then abbreviate
Furthermore, in what follows, we will always keep F su¢ ciently low.
We have the following result.
Proposition 1 Consider the benchmark case in which all downstream …rms are symmetric, both in size and own marginal cost c. Then, for low F there exists a unique equilibrium.
The supplier o¤ers each (independent) …rm the same wholesale price w I , which is strictly increasing in F .
Proof. See Appendix.
The result that the equilibrium wholesale price for each of the independent downstream …rms, w I , is strictly increasing in F is intuitive given that this reduces the value of their outside option.
Hotelling Model
Throughout this paper, we frequently use a standard Hotelling model for each downstream market to, …rst, illustrate our key results and, second, obtain additional, more quantitative implications. Suppose, thus, that each (local) market is represented by the mass one of consumers that is distributed uniformly over the unit interval. As is well known, this implies that at an interior solution the mass
shop at outlet A n , where t denotes the unit transportation cost.
Proposition 2 In the Hotelling case, the supplier realizes with each of the symmetric, independent …rms a margin of
which is strictly increasing in F and also in t.
Proposition 2 con…rms the comparative result in F from Proposition 1. In addition, we …nd that the supplier's margin w I k is strictly higher when there is less competition in the downstream market (given higher "shoe-leather"costs t). 24 The supplier can, thus, set higher wholesale prices to extract higher pro…ts that are generated by a less competitive retail market.
Di¤erential Buyer Power 4.1 Wholesale Prices
To develop the key insights on the waterbed e¤ect, it is su¢ cient to introduce a single large buyer. We do this by supposing that one buyer now operates 2 n L N downstream …rms (or outlets in the case of retailing), each in a separate market. Without loss of generality, let this be the owner of …rms A n with n 2 f1; :::; n L g.
In equilibrium, there will now be three di¤erent wholesale prices. The large buyer obtains a wholesale price w L such that w(A n ) = w L for all n 2 f1; :::; n L g. For the 24 It should be noted, however, that one can not choose the di¤erentiation parameter t arbitrarily small in equation (4) without simultaneously reducing F . This is the case as the derivation of the equilibrium relies on the assumption that switching to the alternative supply option represents a credible alternative for both downstream …rms. If we let t ! 0 while F remains bounded away from zero, however, then a …rm that rejects the o¤er of w I would, instead, be better o¤ when ceasing operations. competing small …rms in these n L markets, we denote w(B n ) = w S for n 2 f1; :::; n L g.
Finally, it is immediate that the wholesale price for all other downstream …rms in markets n > n L , where the large buyer is not active, will be una¤ected by the presence of the larger buyer and will, thus, still be equal to w I , as used in Proposition 1. In analogy to the analysis with symmetric buyers, the three wholesale prices must jointly satisfy the respective participation constraints:
The following analysis proceeds as follows. We …rst derive some general results on the equilibrium characterization in the case of di¤erential buyer power. This is followed by an application to the Hotelling model. As a …nal step, we study the implications for retail prices and, ultimately, consumer surplus and welfare. (Furthermore, we present a numerical example at the end of this Section.)
Analysis of Wholesale Prices
As in Proposition 1, for low F , all participation constraints in (5) bind in equilibrium.
This allows us to obtain the following characterization.
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Proposition 3 Consider the case in which a large buyer controls several downstream …rms in separate markets. The large buyer's wholesale price, w L , is then strictly smaller than the (benchmark) wholesale price in case of symmetric buyers, w I , from Proposition 1, while the wholesale price of competing smaller …rms, w S , is strictly larger than w I . Moreover, as the number of …rms n L that the large buyer controls increases, w L further decreases, while w S further increases.
Hence, we …nd a waterbed e¤ect with w L < w I < w S . Also, note again that when n L increases, the wholesale price di¤erential, w S w L > 0, widens for two reasons: …rst, as w L decreases and, second, as w S increases. 25 This Proposition generalizes Proposition 2 in Inderst (2007) to general demand.
We now provide more intuition for the results in Proposition 3. Here, the …rst part is to show that w L < w I holds. This will be relatively straightforward. The argument for why w S > w I holds is more subtle.
When rejecting the incumbent supplier's o¤er and switching to the alternative source of supply, a buyer incurs the costs F . A large buyer, who controls n L > 1 …rms and consequently buys and sells a larger number of units, can, thus, spread the costs F over a larger number of units. This forces the supplier to reduce the wholesale price so as to still satisfy the large buyer's participation constraint. Formally, this e¤ect can be seen immediately when transforming the large buyer's binding participation constraint (5) into
after dividing by n L .
Turn next to the wholesale price of small …rms that compete with the large buyer.
As the large buyer obtains a discount, which he at least partially passes on into lower retail prices, he will take away market share from smaller …rms. A …rst intuition for why the small …rms' wholesale price, w S ; should increase is that, in analogy to the previous argument for the large buyer, a small buyer can now spread the costs F only over a smaller number of units. However, this argument is incomplete as it ignores that the lower retail price of the large buyer's …rms, given the large buyer's lower wholesale price, will negatively a¤ect both the value of a smaller …rm's outside option, (m; m L ), and the value of his equilibrium payo¤ under the supplier's o¤er, (m S ; m L ). It turns out, however, that the …rst e¤ect is stronger: As the rival …rm in a given market becomes more competitive, following a reduction in its wholesale price, the (negative) e¤ect on the value of a …rm's outside option is stronger, which relaxes the respective participation constraint and, thereby, allows the supplier to raise his wholesale price. This is, in turn, an immediate consequence of the standard property (1) of reduced pro…t functions.
Clearly, for such a waterbed e¤ect to arise, it is crucial that the supplier can price discriminate in the …rst place. In our model, this is the case only if F > 0. As F increases, there is increasing scope for price discrimination, leading to a widening of wholesale price di¤erentials.
Corollary 1 While both wholesale prices, w L and w S , strictly increase with F , also the di¤erence w S w L > 0 strictly increases.
Note that for our theory of the waterbed e¤ect to apply, the adversely a¤ected small …rms must be in competition with the …rms that are controlled by the large buyer. In our model, this is the case for all outlets B n in markets n n L . In contrast, the wholesale price of all other …rms, namely in markets n > n L , is not a¤ected. This observation also provides a key di¤erence to (informal) theories of the waterbed e¤ect that rely on adjustments in the upstream market structure. According to these theories, the exercise of bargaining power by a large buyer reduces suppliers'pro…ts and, thereby, leads to further consolidation in the upstream industry by exit, mergers, or reduced entry. While through his bargaining power, a large buyer is shielded from the resulting increase in suppliers'market power, the conditions of small buyers worsens. According to this theory, small buyers would then be negatively a¤ected irrespective of whether or not they are rivals of the large buyer. 
Retail Prices and Consumer Surplus
We are working under the assumption that prices are strategic complements. This makes the analysis of …nal (retail) prices more interesting, as for small …rms, which face higher wholesale prices, there are now two con ‡icting forces at work. Holding all else constant, small …rms would optimally pass on some of the wholesale price increase. However, as their competitors, namely the …rms controlled by the large buyer, face lower wholesale prices and, thus, reduce their retail prices, small …rms would also want to lower their retail prices. We analyze in this Section how these two forces play out. This is done …rst for the case with general demand, before subsequently deriving more explicit results with the Hotelling model. In the latter case, we can also obtain full explicit implications for changes in consumer surplus and welfare.
Recall, …rst, that for a given reduction in the large buyer's wholesale price, w L , the corresponding change for small buyers is obtained by moving along their binding participation constraint in (5). Denote the respective retail prices by p L and p S , such that along this trajectory we have, from total di¤erentiation, the following marginal impact on small buyers'retail prices:
The fact that the …rst term in (6) is positive while the second term is negative captures the two previously mentioned, con ‡icting e¤ects: First, @p S =@w L > 0 captures the response of small …rms to the large buyer's lower wholesale price, given that this induces the large buyer to lower his retail price, p L ; and, second, dw S =dw L < 0 and dp S =dw S > 0 jointly capture the impact from the waterbed e¤ect. Consequently, if along the whole trajectory
then the waterbed e¤ect would dominate, leading to an increase in small …rms' retail prices. Instead, if the converse of (7) holds along the whole trajectory, then, following a reduction in w L , all retail prices decrease, despite the working of the waterbed e¤ect.
For the general analysis, we can show that if F is su¢ ciently small, such that there is altogether little scope for wholesale price discrimination, then any further growth of the large buyer (i.e., an increase in n L ) will reduce all retail prices.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the large buyer's advantage w S w L > 0 is su¢ ciently small, which is the case when F is small such that there is little scope for the supplier to set discriminatory wholesale prices. Then, an increase in the large buyer's size, through the acquisition of additional …rms (higher n L ), leads to a reduction of all retail prices, despite the presence of a waterbed e¤ect.
Note that competition in the retail market is key for the result in Proposition 4 to hold. Without competition, there would be no e¤ect on other …rms'wholesale and retail prices. Trivially, when the conditions in Proposition 4 hold, as all retail prices go down, consumer surplus and welfare will be higher.
For general demand we can, however, not go beyond Proposition 4 in showing when the waterbed e¤ect will be su¢ ciently strong to result in a higher retail price for smaller rivals. We also do not know whether the waterbed e¤ect can be su¢ ciently strong to lead to a reduction in total consumer surplus, even though the large buyer's retail price, p L , decreases. To analyze these issues, we turn again to the Hotelling model.
Hotelling Model
With Hotelling competition, the total derivative in (6) becomes dp
Hence, the waterbed e¤ect now dominates, such that condition (7) holds, whenever
In words, the small …rms'retail price decreases if due to the waterbed e¤ect their wholesale price, w S , increases by at least half of the reduction in w L . From implicit di¤erentiation of the binding participation constraints we now obtain explicitly that
where y S is the equilibrium market share of the small …rm. 27 Note that the waterbed e¤ect is stronger when smaller …rms are already more disadvantaged (or "squeezed"), given that they have small market shares (low y S ) and have to pay high wholesale prices. In this case p S can increase. Precisely, from (8) and (9) the respective condition is that
Proposition 5 In the Hotelling model, the waterbed e¤ect is stronger if the di¤erence w S w L > 0 is already su¢ ciently large, implying a small market share y S of the small …rm.
When (10) holds, then the waterbed e¤ect even dominates the more intense price pressure from the larger rival, resulting in a higher retail price p S . Condition (10) holds only if the large buyer controls su¢ ciently many outlets (large n L ), competition is su¢ ciently intense (low t), and F is not too low. If the converse of (10) holds strictly, instead, then all retail prices decrease, following a (size-induced) marginal reduction of the wholesale price of the larger buyer.
Summing up, the waterbed e¤ect must be su¢ ciently large to give rise to possible policy concerns, which in turn holds only if the large buyer's advantage is already su¢ ciently 27 Precisely, we have y S :=
. substantial. For this to hold, it is in turn necessary that the large buyer is su¢ ciently larger in size (high n L ), while we also know that higher values F > 0 provide more scope for price discrimination in the …rst place.
An increase in the small …rm's retail prices clearly harms all consumers who still purchase from small …rms. This observation is important if policy-makers take into account distributional e¤ects or intend to protect particular customer groups -e.g., those who are less mobile and, therefore, more exposed to price increases at, say, their local convenience shops in the case of retailing. If, instead, the objective of (antitrust) policy is to ensure that consumers are, on average, better o¤, then condition (10) is not su¢ ciently informative: The higher retail price at the smaller …rms must still be traded o¤ with the lower retail price at the large buyer's …rms.
In the Hotelling model, in which total demand is inelastic, it is immediate that the (marginal) change in consumer surplus, CS, is given by the (marginal) change in the average retail price:
Substituting again for the explicit expressions in the case of the Hotelling model, we obtain that, through the waterbed e¤ect, total consumer surplus is lower if
Condition (12) is clearly stricter than condition (10), which ensured only that small …rms' retail prices increase. Note next that, given y S 1=2, condition (12) is again more easily satis…ed when small …rms are more disadvantaged, leading to a lower market share y S and a relatively higher wholesale price w S .
Proposition 6 In analogy to Proposition 5, the waterbed e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong to increase even the average retail price and, thus, decrease consumer surplus in the Hotelling model if condition (12) is satis…ed. This holds again only if n L and F are both su¢ ciently large, while t is su¢ ciently small, thereby ensuring that the wholesale price di¤erence w S w L > 0 is itself already su¢ ciently large.
28 Formally, denoting by u the gross utility from consuming one unit, total consumer surplus equals
which after di¤erentiation w.r.t. w L yields (11).
Note, …nally, that in the Hotelling model, an increase in the large buyer's size, n L , always reduces welfare. This holds, as in order to minimize shoe-leather costs, an equal split of each local market between the respective two …rms would be e¢ cient. Any strictly positive wholesale price di¤erence will, thus, lead to ine¢ ciencies. It is important to note that this will be di¤erent in the analysis in Section 5, where di¤erences in size and buyer power originate from di¤erences in …rms'own e¢ ciencies, as captured by di¤erent marginal costs of operations.
Numerical Example
We conclude this Section with a short numerical example. The main objective of this is to show that, in particular, the stricter condition (12) is obtained under parameter values that are not "unrealistic."As the absolute values of the various variables have no particular meaning, given that they can simply be scaled up and down, we focus on …rms'margins.
For a simple numerical example, we suppose that a large buyer originally controls n L = 2 …rms -i.e., double the number of …rms (or outlets) that any of the the small buyers have. Subsequently, the large buyer's number of …rms doubles to n L = 4. Our choice for the various variables of the model of Hotelling competition is at follows: t = 0:7 for the measure of horizontal di¤erentiation, k = 7 for the supplier's marginal cost and c = 0 for downstream …rms'marginal cost. In addition, we choose F = 0:4.
For the original situation -i.e., with n L = 2 -we obtain the respective wholesale prices w S 8:43 and w L 7:38, yielding for the supplier a margin of 20 percent with a small buyer and a margin of only …ve percent with a large buyer. Overall, the large buyer obtains a discount of 12:4 percent compared to the wholesale price of a small …rm. Competition in the downstream market obtains the respective retail prices p S 8:78 and p L 8:43.
The margins of the two competitors are, thus, equal to 12:4 percent and four percent, respectively. As the large buyer further grows, its relative discount increases from 12:4 percent to 26:4 percent. To be precise, w L decreases to about 7:15, while w S increases to about 9:04. The large buyer's margin is now 14:3 percent, while that of small …rms is down to below one percent. Finally, calculating the retail prices that prevail after the large buyer further expands, we …nd that the average price indeed increases, albeit by only slightly less than one percent.
Discussion of the Model
In the present model, we assumed that the supplier o¤ers observable linear wholesale contracts. The assumption of observability is, given the restriction to linear contracts, not essential for our results to hold. To see this, take the benchmark case of Proposition 1 and suppose, instead, that o¤ers were not observable. We …rst specify that …rms hold "passive beliefs"when encountering an unexpected (o¤-equilibrium) o¤er by the supplier. That is, the o¤er that a particular …rm receives will not change the …rm's expectations about the o¤er that the supplier makes to other buyers.
For brevity, we already restrict consideration to candidate equilibria in which the supplier serves all …rms. In addition to the equilibrium o¤ers w(A n ) and w(B n ) in market n,
we now have to introduce the notation b w(B n ) and b w(A n ) for the respective expectations.
In equilibrium, it must hold that w(B n ) = b w(B n ) and w(A n ) = b w(A n ). Now, take the o¤er to …rm A n . Using in analogy to (2) and (3) 
Likewise, for …rm B n we obtain
If both constraints (13) and (14) bind in equilibrium, then, together with w(B n ) = b w(B n ) and w(A n ) = b w(A n ), the equilibrium is pinned down by exactly the same conditions as in the case of observable contracts. That the two participation constraints bind, at least for low F , follows again from the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1. 29 Applying these arguments also to the case with asymmetric …rms yields the following result.
Proposition 7 With linear wholesale prices, results are (at least for low F ) independent of whether contracts are mutually observable or whether they are unobservable and downstream …rms hold passive beliefs.
It should be noted that the restriction to passive beliefs is not essential. For instance, it is immediate to show that the same result holds under "wary beliefs," where, when 29 More precisely, for low F , any acceptable o¤er must be close to k, regardless of whether the respective participation constraint is based on the true o¤er to the other …rm or on expectations.
faced with an o¤-equilibrium o¤er, a …rm tries to back out what would be the supplier's simultaneous optimal o¤er to the other buyers.
30
As noted in the Introduction, our presumption of linear contracts intends to capture the fact that, in some markets, discounts to powerful buyers seem to be given at the margin, where they have even a short-run impact on downstream competition. As is well known, this generally would not be the case with non-linear contracts. To see this, we discuss next the use of non-linear contracts in the present model. Without loss of generality we can restrict consideration to two-part tari¤ contracts that prescribe for A n a …xed transfer T (A n ); together with a constant (marginal) wholesale price for each purchased unit w(A n ). Suppose that o¤ers are not mutually observable. As is well known, when combined with passive beliefs in particular, this leads to an extreme opportunism problem for the supplier.
31 To see this, note, …rst, that by optimality the supplier will surely set the respective transfers T (A n ) and T (B n ) so that the respective participation constraint just binds. For instance, this implies for A n that
Moreover, also by optimality and given passive beliefs, w(A n ) and, thus, m(A n ) = w(A n )+c will be set to maximize the joint surplus realized between the supplier and A n . The opportunism problem lies in the fact that the two parties do not take into account the negative externality that a resulting reduction of the retail price of A n has on the pro…ts of B n . In equilibrium, this leads, for all downstream …rms, to marginal wholesale prices that are equal to the supplier's marginal cost: w(A n ) = w(B n ) = k. 32 This result extends to the case in which buyers have di¤erent size, as now n L enters the supplier's program only through decreasing the maximally feasible …xed transfer (namely, by the amount
Suppose, …nally, that non-linear contracts are observable, in which case we can again dispose of the additional notation for expectations ( b w and b m). It is useful to rewrite the 30 On the other hand, it is also immediate that the equilibrium with unobservable contracts is not generally independent of beliefs. To see this, recall …rst that, from (1), the participation constraint for a given …rm becomes harder to satisfy if the (expected) wholesale price for the rival …rm increases. Beliefs that associate any out-of-equilibrium o¤er with a very high wholesale price for the rival …rm can sustain equilibria where not both participation constraints bind. 31 Cf. McAfee and Schwartz (1993) and O'Brien and Sha¤er (1994) . 32 Cf. Rey and Vergé (2004) .
by optimality binding participation constraints, which yields
for A n and
for B n . Suppose that the supplier would choose w(A) = w(B n ) = w to maximize joint industry pro…ts, which, for given symmetric quantities q, are equal to 2[ (m; m) qk]. To dampen downstream competition, this would intuitively call for some price w = w > k.
33
Any lower wholesale price would lead to too-low retail prices and too-high …nal sales.
Still, we …nd that the supplier's optimal wholesale price is strictly lower, thus satisfying k < w < w. This holds since through reducing the wholesale price for, say, A n -i.e., by setting w(A n ) < w -the supplier bene…ts, as this relaxes the participation constraint of the rival …rm B n . 34 It is important to note that the resulting optimal wholesale prices are still symmetric for both buyers, irrespective of whether they both operate a single …rm, as presently assumed, or whether one buyer is larger and operates n L > 1 …rms.
Proposition 8 Suppose that the supplier o¤ers non-linear contracts. Then, regardless of whether contracts are observable or non-observable (with passive beliefs), all buyers, regardless of the number of …rms they control, receive the same marginal wholesale price and, thus, have the same market share in each local market. With non-observable contracts, the supplier's symmetric wholesale price is equal to his marginal cost, w = k, while it is strictly higher with observable contracts.
As noted in the Introduction, Proposition 8, together with the preceding results from the analysis with linear contracts, points out the importance of the contractual form for 33 We assume for convenience that this is uniquely determined. 34 Formally, to determine the optimal marginal wholesale prices, denote the equilibrium quantities by q(m(A n ); m(B n )) and q(m(B n ); m(A n )), respectively. The supplier's pro…ts are then equal to
where the …rst line captures total industry pro…ts and the second line the joint value of the two buyers' outside options. For a symmetric choice w(A) = w(B n ) = w abbreviate industry pro…ts by !(w), such that from symmetry w maximizes the above objective function if
the present theory of a waterbed e¤ect: If discounts to larger buyers are not given "at the margin," then, in the short run, large buyers are not made more competitive, which, according to the present theory, rules out a waterbed e¤ect.
Sources of Buyer Power
The present analysis is based on a particular theory of buyer power. According to this theory, a buyer who grows through acquiring more …rms (e.g., outlets) in separate markets will obtain a discount as, following Katz (1987) , the buyer's outside option becomes more attractive: He can spread over a larger number of units any …xed costs, F , that would arise from switching his source of supply. As noted above, these …xed costs F could also arise at a new supplier that makes a competitive o¤er.
In retailing, such costs could, for instance, arise from switching to private labels or from tapping into a new, foreign source of supply for a particular merchandise. In both cases, a …rm may spend substantial resources to locate a new source of supply and, in addition, to ensure that any new supplier produces, especially in the case of private labels, to a su¢ ciently high standard of quality. It is straightforward to show that all our results would hold if, instead of incurring …xed costs F > 0, all …rms could switch to a less productive source of supply at zero costs, but could, through the choice of some (continuous) up-front investment, either locate a more attractive source of supply or make a given, alternative supplier more attractive. Again, these costs could be spread over a larger number of units in the case of a large buyer, making his outside option more attractive.
In our model, the fact that larger buyers obtain more attractive terms of supply is key for all results. If, in a given case, data instead suggest that larger buyers can not obtain discounts, then our model of the waterbed e¤ect should not be applicable.
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The theory of buyer power in the present model works through an endogenous variation of the value of buyers'outside options. Alternatively, some buyers could receive a higher fraction of joint pro…ts, as the value of the outside option of the respective suppliers is particularly low when dealing with these buyers -e.g., as suppliers become economically dependent on the business with some large buyers. Such a theory of buyer power has been particularly in ‡uential in competition policy, though we are not aware of a formalization.
Thus, whether a waterbed e¤ect would hold also with such a foundation of buyer power remains to be analyzed.
Extensions

Further Comparative Results
Using the explicit derivations from the Hotelling model, we can obtain some further comparative results on when the waterbed e¤ect should be stronger or weaker. In the present model, the incumbent supplier's pricing power on the wholesale market derives only from the costs F , given that we have, for simplicity, set the marginal cost of the alternative source of supply equal to the incumbent supplier's own marginal cost: k AL = k. Allowing now for an additional cost advantage of the supplier with k AL k, we have the following result.
Corollary 2 In the Hotelling model, the waterbed e¤ect is stronger if, ceteris paribus, the incumbent supplier's power is larger as either F or k AL is larger.
In the present model, the pricing power of the incumbent is constrained by the attractiveness of buyers' alternative supply option. In this sense, the incumbent supplier is a monopolist for the considered subset of …rms, albeit one that can be bypassed. Our model does, however, not cover the case in which buyers already "stock"goods of alternative suppliers, implying that they could shift purchases and sales between the di¤erent products at zero additional cost (cf. also Section 4.3). Smith and Thanassoulis (2009) consider, instead, a more elaborate bargaining model with uncertainty that allows for a bilateral oligopoly and that can also generate a waterbed e¤ect.
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The present analysis has also restricted consideration to the impact that a single large buyer has on each of several smaller buyers. The impact from the waterbed e¤ect should depend, however, also on the strength -i.e., in the present framework, the size -of the a¤ected buyer. To formally investigate this, suppose that in the n L markets that the large buyer serves, 1 < n l < n L …rms are owned by another buyer. If n L increases through further acquisitions, the wholesale prices of both small, independent …rms, as well as the wholesale price of the second large buyer with, n l …rms, increase.
Formally, the increase in the respective wholesale prices, w S and w l , is again obtained from the binding participation constraints, as in (9). 37 As it is immediate from the participation constraints that w S > w l and, thus, also that y S < y l < 0:5, we have from (9) the following result.
Corollary 3 In the Hotelling model, if the large buyer who expands his size and obtains an additional discount competes against other buyers of di¤erent size, then the waterbed e¤ect is strongest for the smallest buyer.
Firm Growth and the Waterbed E¤ect
In the preceding analysis, we captured the growth of one buyer by enlarging the number n L of …rms that this buyer controls. In this Section, we consider, instead, the case of "organic growth" through a …rm's improved e¢ ciency. We can show that this still gives rise to a waterbed e¤ect. However, welfare implications will be markedly di¤erent.
For the sake of brevity, we return to the case in which each …rm is operated independently, which allows us to analyze each of the N markets in isolation. Our departure from the perfectly symmetric case analyzed in Section 3 is, however, that …rms can now di¤er in their marginal costs, where we set without loss of generality c(A n ) < c(B n ). Competing …rms'gross marginal costs m(A n ) and m(B n ) may, thus, di¤er both because their wholesale prices w(A n ) and w(B n ) are di¤erent and because they have di¤erent costs of operations, c(A n ) < c(B n ). Denote, also, the respective gross marginal costs under the alternative supply option by m AL (A n ) := k + c(A n ) and, likewise for B n , by m AL (B n ) := k + c(B n ).
Proposition 9 If di¤erences in …rm size are due to di¤erences in their own e¢ ciency, then the insights from Proposition 3 still survive. Precisely, the more e¢ cient and thus larger …rm -i.e., A n as c(A n ) < c(B n ) -also obtains a lower wholesale price, w(A n ) < w(B n ), while a further reduction in c(A n ) leads to a further widening of the di¤erence w(B n ) w(A n ) > 0, both as w(A n ) decreases and as w(B n ) increases (the waterbed e¤ect).
Recall that previously, at least in the Hotelling model with inelastic total demand, the growth in buyer power through acquisitions always reduced welfare: Both the reduction of the larger buyer's wholesale price and the increase of the wholesale price of smaller rivals led to a further distortion of market shares away from the e¢ cient (equal) split, given that …rms were equally e¢ cient.
Trivially, if …rm A n reduces its own marginal cost, then this a positive direct e¤ect on consumer surplus and (gross of investment costs) also on welfare. This positive e¤ect would, however, exist even without discriminatory wholesale prices -i.e., if F = 0 in the present model. For F > 0, the more e¢ cient …rm enjoys, however, an additional comparative advantage as its wholesale price is lower than that of the rival …rm. This induces a further shift of market share to the more e¢ cient …rm. As is well known, for c(A n ) < c(B n ) but w(A n ) = w(B n ) = w the market share for the more e¢ cient …rm is too low from the perspective of maximizing e¢ ciency. This holds, as the more e¢ cient …rm optimally does not fully pass on its e¢ ciency advantage, but charges, instead, a higher margin. For low values of F , where the di¤erence w(B n ) w(A n ) > 0 is still small, we have the following key di¤erence between the case with acquisitions and that with growth through a …rm's improved e¢ ciency.
Proposition 10 In the Hotelling model, if one buyer is larger only because he owns more …rms through prior acquisitions, then an increase in F , which creates more scope for the supplier to set discriminatory wholesale prices, reduces welfare. Instead, if a buyer is larger as he is more e¢ cient, then, at least for low F , the resulting larger wholesale price di¤erence improves welfare.
It should be noted that irrespective of whether a buyer obtains an additional discount either through further acquisitions or after improving its own e¢ ciency, this discount is not justi…ed by any additional savings or improved e¢ ciencies on the wholesale side. Hence, from an antitrust perspective, the two cases in Proposition 10 would, in principle, not receive di¤erent treatment. Proposition 10 suggests, however, at least from a welfare perspective, a di¤erent impact.
Conclusion
The present paper introduces a formal model of a "waterbed e¤ect" that arises from the exercise of asymmetric buyer power. Key to our theory of the waterbed e¤ect is the interaction of the horizontal and the vertical dimensions: The waterbed e¤ect arises only if buyers compete in the downstream market and if size leads to an additional discount.
According to the present theory, the waterbed e¤ect should already work in the short run, having an impact on wholesale and retail prices and, thereby, on consumer surplus and The present theory provides the following guidance on when a waterbed e¤ect could be more powerful, leading to aggregate consumer detriment even though the retail price of the advantaged powerful buyer still decreases. This is more likely if discounts are given more "at the margin,"where they matter for …rms'competitive position. Consumer harm is also more likely if the supplier has substantial scope to price discriminate, as he has a more uncontested position vis-à-vis other sources of supply and if, in addition, downstream …rms'present size di¤erence provides substantial grounds to set discriminatory wholesale prices.
The analysis also revealed an important di¤erence when wholesale price discounts are obtained based on size di¤erences that were created from acquisitions and when size differences were due to growth by improved e¢ ciency. In the latter case, discriminatory wholesale prices may have the potential to improve e¢ ciency, provided that the di¤erence between rivals is not too large.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We start with some technical observations. We will use throughout that the supplier optimally sets both wholesale prices not below the supplier's marginal cost k. (This property is easily established.) Also, we will assume that we can restrict consideration to some bounded interval [k; w] such that both w(A n ) and w(B n ) must lie in this interval. Finally, we will assume that derived downstream pro…t functions are continuous in marginal costs.
We show …rst that for F ! 0, both w(A n ) and w(B n ) must become arbitrarily close to k. Suppose, to the contrary, that along a sequence of equilibria where F ! 0, this would not hold such that the respective values of, say, w(A n ) > k remained bounded away from k. Then, the right-hand side of (2) would clearly exceed the left-hand side for all su¢ ciently low F .
We argue next that for su¢ ciently low values of F , it holds from optimality for the supplier that both participation constraints bind. Instead of appealing directly to some concavity restriction imposed on the supplier's problem, our argument assumes only that F shall be small. (Note, however, that this is only a su¢ cient, but by no means a necessary, assumption. 38 ) Denote now for the supplier's pro…ts (m(A n ); m(B n )) :
where D( ) denotes the by assumption symmetric derived demand function at downstream …rms. The supplier's total pro…t is, thus, given by
0. This also clearly extends to the case in which w(B n ) is close to k. By these observations, it then follows immediately that for low F , at least one participation constraint must bind. Suppose next that only the constraint of B n was binding, but not that of A n .
When marginally increasing m(A n ) while adjusting m(B n ) to still satisfy the constraint 38 While our key results on consumer surplus will only be derived for low F in the general case, for the Hotelling model, where we need not invoke such low boundaries for F , we also derive results for higher values of F . for A n with equality, the supplier's total pro…ts change by
Given that, for low F , we have that w(B n ) is close to k and, thus, m(B n ) close to m, we have that (18) must be close to zero. (We also assume here that both w(B n ) and w(A n ) stay in [k; w], which implies that the denominator is bounded away from zero.) By these observations, the sign of (17) is determined by the …rst expression in rectangular brackets, which for w(A n ) close to k is again always strictly positive.
Thus, we have established that an optimal pair of o¤ers must satisfy the system of the two binding constraints, which we rewrite as
We show now that, for low F , there is only a single solution to (19). A su¢ cient condition for this to be the case is that the Jacobian matrix of (19) is strictly positive de…nite. This holds if all principal minors are positive. To see that this is indeed the case, note …rst that the derivative of the …rst line of (19) w.r.t. m(A n ) and the derivative of the second line of (19) w.r.t. m(B n ) are strictly positive from 1 ( ) > 0. Next, the determinant is given by
where the sign holds surely for low F , given that the second line goes to zero while the …rst line remains bounded away from zero. (Note that we assume again that both m(A n ) and m(B n ) must become close to m.)
Taken together, we have thus established that in the presently considered symmetric case there is a unique optimal o¤er to both …rms in a given market, w I , such that
Implicit derivation of (20) yields
Note that in order to sign (21), we could assume that 1 < 0 and that F becomes small, which allows us to ignore the second term in the denominator. However, from condition
(1) (21) generally holds as, given that m I > m and 12 < 0, we have also that 2 (m; m I )
Proof of Proposition 2. If there is an equilibrium in which market n is fully covered and both …rms are active, the equilibrium price of …rm A n is
while pro…ts of A n are given by
Substituting this into (20), we have the requirement that
which transforms to (4). It is immediate that (4) is strictly decreasing in F . Di¤erentiating (4) w.r.t. t, we have next that
where we assume from (22) that 3F > w I k. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. The argument why, for low F , the optimal pair of o¤ers is characterized again by the system of binding constraints and why this has a unique solution is perfectly analogous to that in the proof of Proposition 1 and is, therefore, omitted.
Denote now for convenience F L := F=n L such that the binding constraints become
Total di¤erentiation of (24) yields
Note that the signs follow from condition (1) and as the determinant satis…es Det > 0, which we already showed in the proof of Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1. Proceeding now as in the proof of Proposition 3, we have from
Cramer's rule that
which from n L > 1 holds surely if F is su¢ ciently low. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. To evaluate (7), note …rst that from implicit di¤erentiation of the small …rm's binding participation constraint, we have that
As already noted in the proof of Proposition 1, where we used the same expression in (18), we have from m S ! m as F ! 0 that dw S =dw L ! 0. This implies that for the converse of (7) to hold strictly for low F , we only need that dp S =dw L > 0, where we use condition (1), must remain bounded away from zero. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. As the assertion uses Corollary 1 also for costs F that are not close to zero, we have to establish that the result also holds more generally with Hotelling competition. Substituting the respective expressions into requirement (25), we have after some transformations that
Note …rst that for n L = 1, this holds just with equality, as in this case we have also that m S = m L . Condition (26) thus holds for all n L > 1 as m S is strictly increasing and m L strictly decreasing in n L .
Next, note that we obtain for the Hotelling case the two participation constraints
from which the respective derivatives in the main text follow immediate. Observe also that from Corollary 1 and Proposition 3 we generally have that both w S and w S w L increase in F and n L . Hence, in the Hotelling model, y S decreases (i.e., the left-hand side of condition (10)), while (w S k)=(3t) increases (i.e., the right-hand side of condition (10)) as F or n L increase. Note next that at F = 0, the converse of (10) holds strictly, given that then y S = 0:5 and w S k = 0. As we now increase F , 39 we ask whether there exists a threshold F 0 such that from F > F 0 condition (10) holds. For this we can transform condition (10) to 3t < 3(w S k) (w L k), while noting that, for any given F; we have w L k ! 0 as n L ! 1, such that in the limit the condition transforms to t < w S k.
40
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 2. It is useful to …rst write explicitly the two binding participation constraints. This yields
From implicit di¤erentiation of the participation constraint for the small …rm, we obtain for the waterbed e¤ect dw S dw L = 1 6t
39 That is, with the constraint of staying in the region where it is optimal for the supplier to still choose both wholesale prices such that the respective participation constraints bind. 40 Importantly, note that at 3t < 3(w S k) (w L k) both …rms have still strictly positive market shares.
Next, assuming again that the determinant of this system is positive, Det > 0, we have from Cramer's rule that
To see that dw S =dw L in (29) increases with k AL , note that dw S =dk AL > 0 and that d(w S w L )=dk AL = 0 follows after substitution from (30). (Hence, in the Hotelling model, a change in k AL has no e¤ect on the di¤erence w S w L .) Finally, note that the comparative statics in F follows from Proposition ??, which is easily adapted to k AL 6 = k. Q.E.D.
which follows from 11 > 0 in (1) together with m AL (A n ) < m(A n ) due to w(A n ) > k.
Next, we have that
, where now D B is given by 1 (m(A n ); m(B n )) 2 (m AL (B n ); m(A n )) 2 (m(B n ); m(A n )) 1 (m AL (A n ); m(B n ) 1 (m(A n ); m(B n )) 2 (m AL (B n ); m(A n )) 2 (m(B n ); m(A n )) :
To obtain D B > 0 and, thus, dw(B n )=dc(A n ) < 0, we can now assume from (1) that 12 < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 10. We show that in the Hotelling model, the wholesale price difference is indeed strictly increasing in F . For simplicity, we abbreviate A n by A and B n by Note …rst that the expression for the waterbed e¤ect is, thus, exactly the same as in (9).
With Det > 0 for the determinant and Q.E.D.
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